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Abstract 
Implied Base Correlations of Single-tranche CDOs on standardized Credit Indices such as 
the iTraxx Europe have been used in the credit derivatives market for price communica-
tion. During the financial crisis, implied correlations have been quite volatile indicating the 
growing fraction of systematic credit risk of STCDOs. This paper analyses the determi-
nants of tranche implied base correlations for the period September 2006 until April 2009. 
It will be shown that realized asset correlations between iTraxx Europe corporates are not 
able to explain the extreme movements of tranche implied correlations during the financial 
crisis. Additionally, it will be seen that the worsening creditworthiness of market partici-
pants in the interbank market as well as growing pressure on their refinancing conditions 
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1  Introduction 
Before  summer  2007,  international  credit  markets  were  characterized  by  tight  credit 
spreads, which had been the result of low refinancing costs of financial institutions preced-
ing the crisis (BIS, 2008). In order to receive yield-pick-ups over the swap curve, invest-
ments in structured credit grew rapidly since 2004 and became the most profitable business 
field for arrangers, rating agencies and investors.  
 
 
Figure 1: Outstanding Notional of Credit Default Swaps (BIS, 2009) 
 
Since the introduction of standardized index tranches on the iTraxx Europe, the existing 
liquidity switched from individual structured credit exposure to active trading in the new 
tranche- and index-market. For selling protection in the 6-9% mezzanine-tranche in sum-
mer 2004, the market paid investors 60bp, whereas two years later the spread for identical 
risk exposure decreased to 20bp (Scheicher, 2008). After the outbreak of the subprime cri-
sis in summer 2007, market participants became extremely skeptical towards any form of 
credit risk exposure, even if there was no direct relationship to subprime. The obvious 
wrong credit risk estimations of the rating agencies lead to a sudden drying-out of primary 
and  secondary  credit  markets.  Implied  correlations  of  iTraxx  tranches  as  well  as  their 
spreads reached levels which have not been observable before. The premium for credit 
exposure in the above mentioned mezzanine-tranche was ten times higher at the end of 
2008 compared to summer 2006. At the beginning of 2009, the market for standardized 
credit exposure on iTraxx Europe disrupted completely. Prices for on-the-run tranches had 
not been quoted any more. For off-the-run tranches, prices had still been available because 
some market participants were forced to keep them on their books.     
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2  Data and Analysis 
2.1  Development of Implied Correlations during the Financial Crisis 
We have obtained daily quoted implied base correlations of iTraxx Europe tranches with 
five years to maturity from Bloomberg for the period September 2006 to April 2009. Series 
6 of the iTraxx Europe, which started on September 20
th 2006, is the first reference portfo-
lio. It follows Series 7 (March 2007 - September 2007), Series 8 (September 2007 - March 
2008) and Series 9 (March 2008 - September 2008). For Series 10 (September 2008 - 
March 2009) and 11 (March 2009 - September 2009) implied base correlations had not 
been quoted any more. Hence, we use implied base correlations of Series 9 for the respec-
tive period.  For October 2006 only three quotes are available (10/11/2006, 10/17/2006 and 
10/20/2006). For the periods 11/18/2006 - 11/28/2006, 03/21/2006 - 03/25/2006 as well as 
05/05/2007 - 05/20/2007 implied base correlations had not been quoted and will therefore 
not be part of the database. 
 
 
Figure 2: Implied Base Correlations during the Financial Crisis 
 
Due to the very similar development of implied base correlations of the various tranches, 
the implied base correlation of the equity tranche will be in the center of our analysis. The 
first significant increase in implied base correlations could be observed in February 2007, 
when realized defaults in subprime credits became public.
1 Especially, implied correlations 
                                                 
1   In February 2007, a heavy loss of the ABX.HE-Index for weak credit qualities occurred. The index is a 
synthetic price index (CDS-format) on 20 subprime-RMBS (Markit, 2009). Implied Correlations of iTraxx Tranches  
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of tranches with high subordination reacted quite sensitively to the first indicators of grow-
ing systematic credit risk in the market for structured credit. 
   Equity  Junior Mezz  Senior Mezz  Senior Low  Senior High 
Equity  100.00%  91.22%  93.11%  91.36%  89.25% 
Junior Mezz     100.00%  88.10%  83.48%  74.83% 
Senior Mezz        100.00%  99.17%  95.54% 
Senior Low           100.00%  97.83% 
Senior High              100.00% 
 
Table 1: Correlations of Implied Base Correlations (September 2006 - April 2009) 
 
This level of implied base correlation was fairly stable until the outbreak of the subprime 
crisis in summer 2007, when implied correlations of all tranches suddenly jumped for 50% 
and more. Two Hedge-Funds of Bear Stearns, which were heavily invested in subprime 
RMBS, could not meet their margin calls in June 2007 and the bank injected 3.2bn USD. 
During the same month, S&P downgraded subprime-backed securities of 7.3 bn USD no-
tional amount and when other rating agencies followed, the downward spiral began. In July 
2007, the market for ABCP refinancing of SPVs became illiquid, and IKB became the first 
European victim of the subprime crisis when it could not provide the short-term liquidity 
of its conduit “Rhineland Funding”. A bailout of 3.5bn USD paid by state guaranteed and 
private banks had to be organized (Brunnermeier, 2009).   
 
 
Figure 3: Outstanding Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (Federal Reserve Board, 2009) 
 
From  August  to  September  2007,  implied  correlations  of  iTraxx  tranches  decreased 
slightly. During this period massive mark-to-market losses of hedge funds, which relied on 
USD (bn) Implied Correlations of iTraxx Tranches  
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quantitative trading strategies, took place. Fire sales driven by margin calls put pressure on 
international credit- and money markets and the ECB was forced to provide additional 
95bn EUR (overnight-) liquidity for European interbank money markets.  
The FED followed with injections of 24bn USD, reduced the discount rate by 1% to 4.75% 
and accepted additional securities for secured funding. On a short term basis these inter-
ventions had been effective which can be seen in the development of implied base correla-
tions. Nevertheless, implied correlations reached a new high in October/November 2007 
when Northern Rock was nationalized.  
At the beginning of 2008, the markets became nervous about the worsening conditions of 
US-monoliners, which not only secured Agency-Bonds, but also RMBS and other struc-
tured credit products of 2.400bn USD notional amount in order to provide an AAA-rating 
for those securities (Brunnermeier, 2009). When Fitch downgraded the monoliner AM-
BAC, international stock markets collapsed (Asia: -15%, Europe, USA and Japan: -6%) 
and the spreads between Agency-Bonds and US-Treasuries increased drastically. Conse-
quently, Bear Stearns could not meet its short term refinancing in March 2008 and JP Mor-
gan took over the bank for 236m USD (2 USD per share), which resulted in the highest 
level of implied correlation until then. During the following months, implied correlations 
normalized somewhat until summer 2008, when the implicit state guarantees for the bond 
insurers Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had been converted to an explicit one. Nevertheless, 
their share prices dropped further and implied base correlations again increased in a market 
of growing systematic credit risk. Simultaneously, the equity of Lehman Brothers lost al-
most its complete market value and efforts to win international investors in order to streng-
then Lehman’s capital base failed. Money market refinancing became impossible for the 
bank, which had to declare bankruptcy on September 15
th 2008. 
Only one day later Bank of America took over Merrill Lynch and in the same week, the 
equity value of AIG, which was heavily invested in the CDS market, dropped by 90%. 
Accordingly, the Federal Reserve injected 160bn USD into the insurer’s capital base. Im-
plied correlations had been quite volatile during this period, but remained on the level 
which they had reached during the events in early September 2008.    
At the end of the year, the pressure on international money markets further increased until 
global interbank markets completely collapsed. The spread between cash and derivatives 
markets reached an all-time high which resulted in a concerted step of western central 
banks (ECB, Fed, BoE, SNB and BoJ) decreasing their key interest rates by 50bp in No-
vember 2008. The first quarter of 2009 was characterized by state initiatives in order to 
strengthen banks’ balance sheets as well as their refinancing conditions through explicit 
guarantees  for  issued  debt  and  retail  clients’  deposits.  Key  interest  rates  of  developed 
economies reached historical lows of 1% and less until the end of the  relevant period     
(except the Euro Area: 1.25%). Implied Correlations of iTraxx Tranches  
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   Equity  Junior Mezz  Senior Mezz  Senior Low  Senior High 
mean  33.25%  45.23%  49.62%  55.01%  70.93% 
median  37.20%  46.74%  54.35%  61.29%  78.30% 
maximum  55.68%  66.77%  72.48%  77.91%  96.90% 
minimum  7.88%  22.22%  8.67%  8.37%  9.26% 
standard deviation  12.32%  11.32%  16.04%  17.64%  21.60% 
N  591  591  591  591  591 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Implied Base Correlations (September 2006 - April 2009) 
2.2  Asset Correlation and Implied Correlation 
Analyzing the impact of realized asset correlations between the firms in the reference port-
folio on the market implied base correlation (equity) results from the theoretical back-
ground of the HLPGC-Model, which had been widely used to quote implied correlations. 
Within this approach, the joint probability of hitting the default barrier is driven by the 
correlation of the firms asset-returns. Consequently, the question is whether or not and how 
realized asset correlations influenced the implied base correlation of the equity-tranche 
during the financial crisis. 
Generally, two different approaches to calculate asset correlations can be applied. At first, 
the indirect method determines the asset values of all firms in the reference portfolio and 
then measures the correlation of their asset-returns. The direct method approximates asset 
correlations with stock price return correlations (Credit Metrics, 2002). This second me-
thod is justifiable, because asset- and equity correlation are identical when the time frame 
approaches zero (Düllmann, 2008). Moreover, equity price changes of investment-grade 
corporates almost exactly reflect their asset value changes. The value of debt is only influ-
enced by the equity return if the creditworthiness of the firm is weak (Mashal et al., 2003).  
Consequently, we approximate realized asset correlations between iTraxx Europe corpo-
rates with the correlations of their equity returns. Therefore, we represent every single 
firm’s equity return with Vasicek’s One-Factor-Model (Vasicek, 1987), which decomposes 
the return in a systematic and an idiosyncratic factor: 
i i i i   1 M   Y ε ρ − + ρ =  
The factor loading  i ρ  of the systematic risk factor can either be interpreted as the sensi-
tivity of the equity return on the systematic-/market risk (beta) or as the square root of the 
asset correlation of the  respective firm. The correlation with the systematic risk factor 
equals the square root of the firm’s asset correlation, which are supposed to be pairwise 
identical among the names in the portfolio (Düllmann et al., 2003). 
Within the market model, the EUROSTOXX Index will be defined as the relevant system-
atic risk factor for all debtors in the portfolio. The realized asset correlation can then be Implied Correlations of iTraxx Tranches  
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calculated  as  the  average  of  the  squared  correlations  between  every  firm’s  equity-log-
return with the market’s log-return (Düllmann, 2007).
2 
The resulting charts in figure 4 show that realized asset correlations increase in an envi-
ronment of falling equity markets. Especially, strong downturns of the EUROSTOXX at 
the end of 2008 were accompanied by higher asset correlations. In contrast, realized asset 




Figure 4: EUROSTOXX and Realized Asset Correlation during the Financial Crisis ( % 36 . 78 − = ρ ) 
 
Compared to market implied base correlations, realized asset correlations reacted less sen-
sitively to the increase of systematic risk during the financial crisis. Only the dramatic 
events of September 2008 influenced the development of realized asset correlations be-
tween iTraxx Europe firms significantly. 
 
                                                 
2  The relevant data for the stock price returns of iTraxx Europe companies as well as for the EUROSTOXX 
have been obtained from Thomson Reuters. 
3  Negative relationships between the return of a market index and the realized asset- or equity correlation 
between the firms in the index can also be confirmed for longer time periods (e.g. Ang et al., 2002).  Implied Correlations of iTraxx Tranches  
during the Financial Crisis 
 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 145  10 
 
     
Figure 5: Realized and Implied Correlation 
Since November 2007 implied correlations are considerably higher than realized correla-
tions. We have concluded that the market demands a correlation risk premium since the 
start of the subprime crisis. The difference between implied- and realized correlation there-
fore represents the market opinion about the risk that the realized asset correlation will 
change in the near future. When realized correlation increases, the premium tends to de-
crease (e.g. end of 2008), which means that the market expects less “upward correlation 
risk” (Tarashev, 2008). Contrary to this, the relationship seems to be inverted in times of 
decreasing realized asset correlations although a clear dependency cannot be observed. In 
particular, the development of realized asset correlations could not explain the quoted im-
plied base correlations during the financial crisis. 
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Figure 6: Realized Asset Correlation (90 days rolling) vs. Implied Correlation (Equity)                                    
(September 2006 - April 2009) 
   Euro Stoxx  Asset Correlation  Implied Correlation (Equity) 
mean  3552  27.36%  33.25% 
median  3793  26.28%  37.20% 
maximum  4558  36.70%  55.68% 
minimum  1810  19.52%  7.88% 
standard deviation  806  4.27%  12.32% 
N  591  591  591 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of relevant Market Parameters (September 2006 - April 2009)                                       
   EUROSTOXX  Asset Correlation  Implied Correlation (Equity) 
EUROSTOXX  100.00%  -78.36%  -55.54% 
Asset Correlation    100.00%  24.00% 
Implied Correlation (Equity)      100.00% 
 
Table 4: Correlations between relevant Market Parameters (September 2006 - April 2009) 
2.3  Risk Aversion and Implied Correlation 
When the subprime crisis hit the world economy in summer 2007, a shift from idiosyn-
cratic and sector specific components of credit risk to systematic or macroeconomic influ-
ence  factors  could  have  been  observed.  Before  the  financial  crisis,  CDS-Spreads  were 
Realized Asset Correlation 
Implied Correlation (Equity) Implied Correlations of iTraxx Tranches  
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mainly driven by idiosyncratic and sector specific issues. Based on this, the largest fraction 
of CDS-Spreads had been explainable (Longstaff et al., 2007).
4  
Since summer 2007 all three components of credit risk had increased drastically, whereas 
the risk of a systematic credit shock grew in a disproportionally strong way. This observa-
tion differentiated the subprime crisis from the very beginning from earlier credit crises.
5 
Higher levels of CDS-index spreads in summer 2007 could be explained with an increase 
in firm specific risk of about 50%, but the fraction of macroeconomic credit problems al-
most tripled (Bhansali et al., 2008). Those systematic risk components are the driving force 
of positive default correlation and therefore especially important when analyzing implied 
correlations of index tranches on standardized credit indices such as the iTraxx Europe.  
The fact that neither realized asset correlations nor the development of European stock 
markets could explain the (systematic risk sensitive) movements of implied base correla-
tions during the financial crisis, leads to the analysis of further market parameters. It can be 
seen in this connection that the development of the gold price is able to explain the dynam-
ics of the implied correlation of the equity tranche. 
 
 
Figure 7: Gold Price and Implied Correlation during the Financial Crisis 
Panic at the world’s financial markets based on ongoing mark-to-market losses in fixed 
income securities, equities and structured products lead to an increase in the gold price 
from summer 2007 until the end of the relevant period. Investments and hectic regrouping 
                                                 
4   Using a three-factor-model, Longstaff and Rajan could explain the spread of US CDX-Index with firm 
specific components (65%), sector specific risks (27%) and macroeconomic risk factors (8%) for the pe-
riod October 2003 - October 2005. 
5  The downgrades of Ford and General Motors to non investment grade in May 2005 lead to a repricing of 
idiosyncratic and sector specific risk components in international credit markets. Premiums for exposure 
on systematic credit risk only increased slightly. 
USD Implied Correlations of iTraxx Tranches  
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of financial assets into gold from large groups of financial market participants as well as 
private investors have made the gold price a surprisingly exact indicator of the level of risk 
aversion and anxiety due to growing macro risk. The specific characteristics of gold, in 
particular its high level of liquidity and price elasticity in times of a crisis (Demidova-
Menzel et al., 2007), make it a rather good indicator for the macro risk sensitive move-
ments of implied correlations of iTraxx tranches during the financial crisis. Fire sales of 
risky assets and the flight to quality also put pressure on the yields of medium- and long-
term government bonds. Opposite effects due to an increase in credit spreads of industrial-
ized economies make it impossible to explain the irrational risk averse behavior of profes-
sional market participants with government bond prices or yields. Respectively, the devel-
opment of implied correlations of iTraxx tranches, which could be seen as a synonym for 










400 600 800 1000 1200
 
Figure 8: Gold Price vs. Implied Correlation (September 2006 - April 2009) 
 
Moreover, it is assumed that the disrupted functionality of the interbank markets influ-
enced implied correlations significantly. The increase of credit and liquidity risk of finan-
cial institutions could have had an impact on tranche implied correlations, because invest-
ments in STCDOs had been avoided and existing positions had been offset. The price for 
protection against systematic credit shocks therefore increased disproportionally high dur-
ing the financial crisis. One indicator for systematic risk within the interbank market is the 
swap spread
6, which contains both, credit and liquidity risk components (Longstaff et al., 
2006). Due to the relatively low correlation with the explaining variable gold (55.82%), we 
                                                 
6  Difference between the swap rate and the yield of government bonds. We use the five year swap spread 
within the regression (source: Thomson Reuters). 
Gold Price (in USD) 
Implied Correlation (Equity) Implied Correlations of iTraxx Tranches  
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use the swap spread within the empirical model to approximate the higher levels of credit- 
and liquidity risk components in the interbank market during the crisis.
7 
 
Figure 9: Swap Spread and Implied Correlation during the Financial Crisis 
Due to the large fraction which the swap spread is able to explain with respect to the 
movements of implied correlations during the financial crisis, the following chapters will 
concentrate on how much this spread is driven by credit- and liquidity risk components. 
                                                 
7 „Systematic risk is usually measured in terms of the widening of Libor swap spread and the CDS spreads of 
banks and financials. It is thus no surprise that the same period in which supersenior tranches have wid-
ened drastically in spread is accompanied by a sharp widening of swap spreads, financial sector spreads, 
increase in volatility and general reduction in liquidity” (Bhansali et al., 2008) 
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Figure 10: Swap Spread vs. Implied Correlation (September 2006 - April 2009) 
2.4  Credit Risk and Implied Correlation 
As mentioned before, the fraction of systematic risk components in CDS-Spreads increased 
during the financial crisis. The development of implied correlations of iTraxx tranches 
during the first months of the crisis can therefore be approximated quite well with the in-
dex spread. Nevertheless, it has to be taken into account that an increase in idiosyncratic 
risk components, or individual default probabilities (expected loss), had still been the ma-
jor contributor to the levels of index spreads during the crisis (Bhansali, 2008). Using the 
index spread as an explanatory variable for the variance of the systematic risk factor im-
plied correlation is problematic, because one would have to exclude idiosyncratic and sec-
tor specific risk components.  
During the relevant period, tranche spreads are highly correlated with the spread of the 
iTraxx Europe.
8 This leads to the conclusion that the market did not differentiate between 
the various credit risk exposures related to the tranche’s level of subordination. 
 
   iTraxx Europe  Equity  Junior Mezz  Senior Mezz  Junior High  Senior High 
iTraxx Europe  100.00%  97.75%  96.62%  98.53%  98.52%  94.26% 
Equity    100.00%  97.36%  97.91%  96.32%  89.09% 
Junior Mezz      100.00%  98.83%  96.37%  84.92% 
Senior Mezz        100.00%  98.14%  90.21% 
Junior High          100.00%  94.26% 
Senior High            100.00% 
 
Table 5: Correlations between Tranche Spreads and iTraxx Spread (September 2006 - January 2009) 
                                                 
8 Reliable data for tranche spreads are available until 01/30/2009 (source: Bloomberg). 
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Until September 2008 increasing index- and tranche spreads as well as implied correlations 
can be observed (see figure 11). The fact that index- and tranche spreads determine the 
level of implied correlation in a non-linear way (HLPGC-Model) highlights the problem to 
include index- and or tranche spreads as explanatory variables in the (linear) regression 
model. 
The increase of expected losses in the reference portfolio was higher compared to the in-
crease of expected losses in the equity tranche, because implied correlations also increased 
until summer 2008. Since September 2008 one can conclude that the increasing index- and 
tranche spreads neutralize themselves in correlation, which means that the probability den-
sity moves in a rather constant form so that correlation does not change (much). Conse-
quently, the regression of index- and tranche spreads on the implied correlation does not 
deliver useful results for the period September 2008 - April 2009. On the other hand, the 
high explanatory power of index- respectively tranche spreads until September 2008 for 




Figure 11: Implied Correlation, iTraxx Europe and Upront-Premium of the Equity Tranche 
 
Due to the low explanatory power of the index spread for the development of implied cor-
relations from September 2008 - April 2009 we instead use, as mentioned before, the swap 
spread within the empirical model in order to represent the growing systematic credit risk 
in the interbank market. Containing liquidity risk components on the one hand, the swap 
spread is on the other hand an indicator of AA Credit-Spreads (Kobor, 2005), which can be 
defined as the yield difference between government bonds and unsecured bank bonds and 
explains the strong increase of the swap spread until September 2008 almost completely. 
                                                 
9 The Gold price shows almost identical explanatory power for the development of implied correlations until 
September 2008 ( % 62 . 86 R
2 = ) 
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Figure 12: Swap Spread (5y) and AAA-AA Benchmark-Spread (5y) (Bundesbank, 2009) 
If we regress the spread between the AA-AAA benchmark curves on implied correlation 
for the period September 2006 until September 2008, the explanatory power is almost 
identical compared to regressing the iTraxx spread on implied correlation. This is further 
evidence that credit spreads which differ in creditworthiness and industries have contained 
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Figure 13: Swap Spread vs. AAA-AA Benchmark-Spread (09/20/2006 - 09/12/2008) 
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Figure 14: iTraxx Europe vs. Implied Correlation (September 2006 - April 2009) 
2.5  Liquidity Risk and Implied Correlation 
The influence of the dramatic decrease of market liquidity in the tranche market, which 
had been rather liquid before the subprime crisis (Bhan, 2008) on the quoted implied corre-
lations will be the focus of the following analysis. In this connection, we first analyze clas-
sical indicators for the level of market liquidity, before connections of market and funding 
liquidity are discussed. Afterwards, it will be shown that the growing pressure on banks’ 
refinancing conditions can explain the development of the swap spread from September 
2008 - April 2009 and therefore the movements of implied correlations during the last 
months of the relevant period. 
2.5.1  Market Liquidity and Implied Correlation 
In general, one can distinguish between three different forms of market liquidty.
10 The 
Bid/Ask spread measures how much a trader looses if he buys an asset and immediately 
sells it. Market depth measures how much volume of an asset can be traded without affect-
ing its market price. Market elasticity measures how long it takes an asset’s market price to 
return to its previous level after a turnover. Market liquidity risk will be defined as a sud-
den variation in transaction costs (Acharaya et al., 2006) and therefore be approximated 
with the Bid/Ask spread. We suppose that the increase in systematic risk at the financial 
markets, which is represented by increasing implied correlations, can be explained with the 
illiquidity of iTraxx Europe index tranches. 
 
                                                 
10 “Market liquidity risk is the risk that a firm cannot easily offset or eliminate a position at the market price 
because of inadequate market depth or market disruption.” (BIS, 2008) 
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Figure 15: Bid/Ask Spread iTraxx vs. Implied Correlation (September 2006 - September 2009) 
Figure 14 plots the Bid/Ask spread of iTraxx Europe, which can be interpreted as the gen-
eral level of liquidity within the index tranche market (Scheicher, 2008) against implied 
correlation, whereas figure 15 shows the relationship between the Bid/Ask spread of the 
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Figure 16: Bid/Ask Spread Upfront Equity vs. Implied Correlation (September 2006 - September 2009) 
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The explanatory power of classical indicators of market liquidity for the movements of 
implied correlations during the financial crisis is dissatisfying. The fact that the Bid/Ask- 
spread  of  the  upfront  premium  (equity)  decreases  when  implied  correlation  increases 
(Wagner, 2008) could not have been approved for the analyzed period.  
2.5.2  Funding Liquidity and Implied Correlation 
The link between market- and funding liquidity
11 are generally capital requirements of 
banks and collateral needs in interbank trading (Archaya et al., 2008). Market liquidity 
shocks are therefore often accompanied by funding liquidity shocks, because the condi-
tions for traders to refinance themselves have an essential impact on their possibilities to 
provide market liquidity.  
In times of falling asset prices the value of collaterals, which traders need for secured fund-
ing in the interbank repo markets, decreases as well. As a result, increasing haircuts have to 
be  financed  with  the  trader’s  capital  (Brunnermeier  et  al.,  2005).  Liquidity  shocks  are 
therefore often caused by falling asset prices because secured funding of interbank market 
participants is limited due to capital and collateral limits so that traders cannot provide ad-
ditional market liquidity. In those times market prices of financial assets are reduced for 
illiquidity. This reduction represents the cost of capital, which market makers have to pay 
for additional funding liquidity and are especially present in markets for derivatives and 
complex structured products because only a few market makers quote prices. In extreme 
cases, correlations between financial products are then driven by illiquidity, respectively 
by the pressure on banks’ capital and collateral situation, and not by fundamentals (Ar-
charya, 2006). 
Moreover, the pro-cyclical impact of the leverage of investment banks and hedge funds, 
which have been the most important market participants in the index tranche market prior 
to the crisis, enforced the markets illiquidity (Duffie, 2008). When market values dropped, 
balance sheet volume had been reduced in order to keep leverages constant. Additionally, 
fire sales lead to a reduction in secured short-term funding which also put pressure on mar-
ket- and funding liquidity (Adrian et al., 2008). 
On European money markets, the problematic situation of short-term refinancing had been 
represented by widening spreads between cash and derivative instruments (Baba et al., 
2008). 
 
                                                 
11 “Funding liquidity risk is the risk that the firm will not be able to meet efficiently both expected and unex-
pected current and future cash flow and collateral needs without affecting either daily operations or the finan-
cial condition of the firm.” (BIS, 2008) 
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Figure 17: Spread between 3M EURIBOR and 3M EONIA Swap 
The explanatory power of the money market spread for the development of implied corre-
lations is lower than expected. A relationship with the swap spread is present, but prior 
analyses have shown that the swap spread could be explained (until September 2008) with 
increased credit risk in the interbank market. A liquidity risk premium for short-term fund-
ing had been demanded from the market since October 2007, which excludes the money 
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Figure 18: MM-Spread vs. Implied Correlation (September 2006 - April 2009) 
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As an argument that the swap spread contains, beside the credit spread of the interbank 
market (AA), further influence factors, one can argue that the credit risk of a bond is never 
completely comparable to the credit risk of a derivative (Haas, 2004). Therefore we sup-
pose that liquidity risk premiums in medium- and long-term refinancing of banks, which 
could also be approximated with the spread difference of cash and derivative instruments, 
have been present in the swap spread.  
The swap rate usually equals the rate on which interbank market participants have their 
lowest refinancing costs, because a swapped bond issue then costs EURIBOR-flat. After 
September 2008 the market has demanded a liquidity risk premium for banks’ medium and 
long term refinancing, which we approximate with the spread between German Pfandbrief 
issues and the swap rate. The above mentioned pressure on short-term refinancing there-
fore spilled-over to medium and long-term refinancing with the September 2008 events. 
Banks tried to avoid long term funding in historical high liquidity spread environments, 
which put further pressure on short term money market rates. Interdependencies between 
short-term  and  medium-/long-term  refinancing  became  especially  present  at  the  end  of 
2008. 
 
Figure 19: Pfandbrief/Swap-Spread (5y) 
 
The sudden and extreme widening of the spread between German Pfandbrief yields and 
swap rates had been caused mainly by the development of swap rates since September 
2008. In comparison to Bund and Pfanbrief yields, the swap spread decreased dispropor-
tionally when the market started to demand liquidity premiums for medium term refinanc-
ing (figure 19). Therefore, the swap markets, which are generally more liquid than the 
bond markets, had lost their benchmark and pricing status during the crisis, because bond 
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yields quote on a much higher level since September 2008.
12 The swap spread can there-
fore be explained quite well with liquidity risk premiums for medium term bank issues for 
the last months of the analyzed period. We use the average yield of public and mortgage 
secured Pfandbrief bonds with five years to maturity.  
 
Figure 20: Development of Pfandbrief Yield, Swap Rate and Bobl Yield 
 
                                                 
12 If the liquidity risk premium is approximated with the spread between swap rates and unsecured bank is-
sues, the impact for the regression is only marginal. Even if we differentiate between public- and mortgage 
secured or grandfathered issues, the regression is only influenced slightly. Implied Correlations of iTraxx Tranches  
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Figure 21: Swap Spread vs. Pfandbrief/Swap-Spread (09/15/2008 - 04/28/2009) 
The inverse relationship between the swap spread and liquidity risk premiums indicates 
that despite growing credit risk within the interbank markets (increasing spread between 
AAA and AA-Benchmark bonds), the swap spread decreases at the end of the relevant 
period. 
The reason for the over proportional tightening of the swap spread in comparison to bond 
yields is due to the pricing standards for interest rate swaps. The fix leg of the swap (Par-
Coupon-Rate) is determined with the forward rates of the floating leg. Due to central banks 
interventions on international money markets, the floating leg decreased drastically (figure 
21) in an environment of a flat yield curve. It follows a significant decrease in swap rates 
and the fact that bond yields decreased less strongly, shows the interdependence between 
short-  and  medium-term  liquidity  risk  premiums  on  banks’  refinancing  operations  and 
therefore its impact on market liquidity for index tranches and their implied correlations 
since September 2008.  
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Figure 22: 6M Euribor and Prime Rate Implied Correlations of iTraxx Tranches  
during the Financial Crisis 
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3  Determinants of Implied Correlations of iTraxx Tranches during 
  the Financial Crisis 
3.1  Results of the Regression Analysis 
The  highest  explanatory  power  for  the  development  of  implied  correlations  of  iTraxx-
tranches during the financial crisis can be obtained when using the gold price and the swap 
spread as regressors. Adding any of the above discussed market parameters as independent 
variables, under the constraint to avoid multi-collinearity, does not add explanatory power 
to the multiple regression analysis. 
 
 
Figure 23: Implied Correlation and Empirical Model (standardized) 
 
If we approximate the systematic credit risk component using the iTraxx spread within the 
regression and interpret it as the “main regressor”, we cannot add explanatory power using 
additional liquidity risk proxies. Moreover, using asset-correlations or the development of 
the EUROSTOXX (additionally) does not deliver good results. To explain the develop-
ment of implied correlations of the entire capital structure, the regressors gold price and 
swap spread are statistically highly significant. The null hypotheses:  
   0 : H   Gold 0 = β                     0 : H Spread   Swap 0 = β  
          0 : H   Gold 1 ≠ β                            0 : H Spread   Swap 1 ≠ β  Implied Correlations of iTraxx Tranches  
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have to be rejected at α = 0.01 level of significance.  
The development of the gold price explains almost 2/3 of the variations in implied correla-
tions for all tranches, whereas the fraction becomes smaller for tranches of high subordina-
tion. The swap spread explains up to 45% (Senior-High) respectively (see table 6). The 
standard error of the estimate of the regression increases for high levels of implied correla-
tions in comparison to the quoted correlations before the crisis (see figure 24). The com-
plexity to parameterize the empirical model in a way, that it delivers good results for the 
entire period on the one hand, and that explains the strong variation of implied correlations 
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Figure 24: Explanatory Power of the Multiple Regression for the Implied Correlation (Equity) 
 
Until Lehman faced bankruptcy in September 2008, the development of implied correla-
tions could be explained using proxies which represent growing macro-risk in the market 
(gold price, swap spread, iTraxx spread). The goodness of fit of the model for realizations 
of implied correlations below its mean is therefore high. Since the peak of the financial 
crisis in autumn 2008, the extremely high levels of implied correlations could be predicted 
but the explained part of the implied correlations’ variances decreases significantly. There-
fore, increasing variances of the residuals could be observed for levels of implied correla-
tions above their mean (see figure 24). Using the Goldfeld-Quant-Test we examine if het-
eroscedasticity is present. In order to test the null-hypothesis of homoscedasticity against 
the alternative hypothesis of heteroscedasticity within the residuals:  Implied Correlations of iTraxx Tranches  
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we divide the observations into two subsets:  
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  I = 296 observations (09/20/2006 - 03/11/2008) 
 J = 295 observations (03/12/2008 - 04/28/2009) 
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F  
is F-distributed with (J-K) and (I-K) degrees of freedom if the null hypothesis is valid. The 
critical value for a level of significance of 0.05 is: 
≈ 0.05   294;   ; 293 F  1.50 
For the entire capital structure the F-statistic is much higher (see table 6). We have to reject 
the null-hypothesis of homoscedasticity in favor of the alternative hypothesis (hetero- sce-
dasticity) on the 5% level of significance. Moreover, the efficiency of the regressors is in-
fluenced by auto correlated residuals. Implied Correlations of iTraxx Tranches  
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   Equity   Junior Mezz  Senior Mezz  Senior Low  Senior High 
R
2  86.04%  73.80%  68.80%  72.07%  75.10% 
                 
beta (standardized)                
gold price  0.672  0.600  0.583  0.575  0.526 
swap spread  0.367  0.351  0.326  0.372  0.435 
                 
t-value                
gold price  36.165  22.708  20.045  21.389  20.040 
swap spread  19.749  13.283  11.203  13.824  16.558 
                 
p-value                
gold price  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001 
swap spread  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001 
                 
residuals                
skewness  0.79  0.36  0.18  0.36  0.44 
kurtosis  3.50  2.77  2.43  2.76  2.91 
Goldfeld-Quandt   5.97  3.95  3.11  3.93  4.32 
Durbin-Watson  0.33  0.16  0.16  0.15  0.17 
                 
N  591  591  591  591  591 
 
Table 6: Results of the Regression Analysis on Implied Base Correlations 
With a coefficient of determination of 93%, the determinants of the swap spread can be 
identified completely and consequently, the influence of increased systematic credit and 
liquidity risk in the interbank market on implied correlations of iTraxx-Tranches can be 
approximated.  Implied Correlations of iTraxx Tranches  
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Figure 26: Explanatory Power of the Multiple Regression on the Swap Spread 
Following that, the p-values of the independent variables AAA-AA Benchmark-Spread 
and Pfandbrief-Swap-Spread are very small. Hence, the statistical dependence is strong. 
Contrary to the results of the regression analysis for implied correlations, the possibility of 
non-observance of explaining variables is not given, even if heteroscedasticity and autocor-
relation is also present within the residuals. 
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   Swap Spread 
R
2  93.17% 
   
beta (standardized)   
AAA-AA Benchmark-Spread  2.041 
Pfandbrief/Swap-Spread  -1.473 
   
t-value   
AAA-AA Benchmark-Spread  83.866 
Pfandbrief/Swap-Spread  -60.168 
   
p-value   
AAA-AA Benchmark-Spread  < 0.001 
Pfandbrief/Swap-Spread  < 0.001 
   
residuals   
skewness  -0.20 
kurtosis  4.33 
Goldfeld-Quandt  3.83 
Durbin-Watson  0.18 
   
N  591 
 
Table 7: Results of the Regression Analysis on the Swap Spread 
 
The strong correlation between the independent variables of 89.87% is not problematic 
with  regard  to  multi-collinearity,  because  the  regressors  enter  the  model  with  opposite 
signs, which is economically reasonable and corresponds to the expectations formulated 
before. 
3.2  Discussion and Remarks 
That market implied parameters quote significantly above realized ones and that they react 
more sensitively to changing levels of risk aversion in times of a crisis is common and can 
also be observed for other asset classes. The fact that realized asset correlations of iTraxx 
Europe corporates have no explanatory power for implied correlations is surprising. Even 
until summer 2007, both correlation parameters seemed to be independent of each other. 
The  influence  of  the  development  of  EUROSTOXX  on  implied  correlations  of  iTraxx 
tranches has been confirmed but the relationship between equity markets and implied cor-
relations is by far not as strong as the interdependence between the spread of iTraxx Eu-
rope and EUROSTOXX returns (correlation: -94.32%).  
The  simultaneous  development  of  the  gold  price  and  implied  correlations  of  iTraxx 
tranches shows the dimension of the global crisis because during former banking-, finan-
cial market- and economic crises, the gold price never moved as strongly as during the 
analyzed period. Even the Argentina Crisis at the end of the 90ies, which had been a desas-Implied Correlations of iTraxx Tranches  
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ter for the national economy, did not have an impact on the gold price development. There-
fore, two sensitive proxy variables for increasing global macro-risk and their interdepend-
ences have been shown. 
The analysis of interrelationships between credit spreads (iTraxx Europe, AAA and AA 
Benchmark Curves) and their influence on implied correlation have shown that implied 
correlations could be explained with the growing fraction of systematic credit risk within 
credit spreads until September 2008. Since autumn 2008 the influence of the index spread 
on implied correlation is irreproducible. The reason is that implied correlations are deter-
mined by index- and tranche-spreads in a non-linear way. Moreover, implied correlations 
are  influenced  by  a  lot  of  economic  factors  which  cannot  be  represented  within  the 
HLPGC-Model. 
For this reason, liquidity risk in interbank markets, which suddenly appeared on banks’ 
risk management agenda in summer 2007, has been analyzed. In this connection it was 
demonstrated that liquidity risk premiums have been present in the European money mar-
kets since summer 2007 when market participants started to hoard liquidity. For medium- 
and long-term capital market refinancing, the market demanded liquidity risk compensa-
tion since September 2008. Based on the interdependencies between market- and funding 
liquidity, it has been argued that the illiquidity of financial markets and especially of credit 
derivatives markets could explain the constantly high levels of tranche implied correlations 
since autumn 2008. In contrast, the results of the regression analysis show that the explana-
tion of implied correlations’ variance since Lehman’s default and therefore the explanation 
of the quoted prices for taking systematic credit risk is not possible with standard instru-
ments of economic analysis  
Furthermore, it was shown that the swap spread is a very good proxy for the systematic 
component of credit risk in the interbank market and liquidity risk premiums of capital 
market refinancing. The spread between german government bonds and bank bonds deter-
mined the swap spread for the entire period, whereas liquidity risk aspects of medium-term 
refinancing operations influenced the development of the swap spread significantly since 
autumn 2008. Implied Correlations of iTraxx Tranches  
during the Financial Crisis 
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